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AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON RJR NABISCO V. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
 
THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESUMPTION 
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Hannah L. Buxbaum* 
Introduction 
In RJR Nabisco v. European Community1, the Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial application of  U.S. 
law for the third time in six years—in this case examining the geographic scope of  the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).2 The decision consolidates and in certain respects expands upon the 
test for analyzing extraterritoriality issues that the Court had introduced in Morrison v. National Australia Bank3 
and refined in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.4 It also provides further evidence of  the Court’s continuing quest 
to identify categorical, territory-based rules governing the application of  U.S. statutes in cases involving signif-
icant foreign elements. As I will argue, however, like other recent decisions, RJR raises doubt as to the sufficiency 
of  such rules to address the messy and often unpredictable patterns of  transnational economic activity. 
The case involved a lawsuit initiated in 2000 by the European Community, on behalf  of  itself  and twenty-
six member states. In brief, the complaint alleged that RJR, acting in concert with other participants including 
Colombian and Russian drug traffickers, participated in a scheme to smuggle narcotics into Europe and use the 
resulting proceeds to pay for shipments of  RJR cigarettes.5 The RICO claim was based on a number of  predi-
cate offenses including money laundering and support to foreign terrorist organizations. The alleged injuries to 
the European Community included “competitive harm to their state-owned cigarette businesses, lost tax reve-
nue from black-market cigarette sales, harm to European financial institutions, currency instability, and 
increased law enforcement costs.”6 RJR moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that RICO has no extra-
territorial effect, arguing that the statute did not apply to racketeering activity occurring outside the borders of  
the United States. (Alternatively, it argued that the statute did not apply to the activity of  foreign enterprises.)  
 
* John E. Schiller Chair in Legal Ethics, Indiana University Maurer School of  Law. 
Originally published online 09 August 2016. 
1 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
2 18 U.S.C. 96.  
3 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).  
4 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
5 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2098, slip op. at 4. 
6 Id. At 2098, slip op. at 5. In an earlier opinion, the Second Circuit had barred the claims for lost tax revenue on the basis of  the so-
called “revenue rule,” under which the courts of  one country will not enforce the tax laws of  another. European Community v. RJR 
Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d. Cir. 2005). 
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In the first part of  its opinion, the Supreme Court considered whether RICO’s substantive provisions apply 
to foreign conduct. Following the approach it had outlined in Morrison, it asked whether the statute gives a clear, 
affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. While RICO does not contain an explicit statement to 
that effect, it defines “racketeering activity” to include a number of  predicate offenses, some of  which do apply 
explicitly to foreign conduct. The Court concluded that this was sufficient evidence that Congress intended 
RICO to apply extraterritorially in claims based on those predicate offenses.7 In the second part of  the opinion, 
the Court applies the presumption against extraterritoriality to the section of  RICO creating a private right of  
action. This comment focuses on that part of  the opinion. 
Private Enforcement and the Threat of  International Discord 
The civil remedies section of  RICO, 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c), creates a private right of  action allowing 
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of  a violation of  section 1962” to recover treble 
damages for the resulting harm. In addressing this provision, the Court expressed its concern that “providing 
a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for international friction beyond that presented by 
merely applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign conduct.”8 In describing the extent of  this potential friction, 
the Court hoists the European states with their own petard. In previous lawsuits involving the extraterritorial 
application of  U.S. antitrust and securities laws, many had filed amicus briefs arguing that certain aspects of  the 
U.S. remedial scheme (particularly treble damages) were incompatible with their local justice systems. In RJR, 
the Court quotes from several of  these opinions, reading back to the European states the objections they had 
previously raised.9  
Of  course, as the European Community pointed out, those concerns had been raised in the context of  
litigation initiated by private plaintiffs—who would be unlikely to “exercise the type of  self-restraint or demon-
strate the requisite sensitivity to the concerns of  foreign governments” expected in actions initiated by public 
regulators.10 Thus, many of  the arguments in the amicus briefs focused on preventing a state’s own citizens (as 
investors in a securities claim, for instance, or as purchasers in an antitrust claim) from “bypassing” the remedial 
scheme of  their home jurisdiction in favor of  a more attractive U.S. forum. In this case, the European Com-
munity argued, there was no such risk, since the plaintiffs were the foreign countries themselves. The Court 
rejected this argument as an invitation to create a “double standard.”11 Because the rule it adopted would hence-
forth govern suits by private as well as governmental plaintiffs, the Court concluded, it could not overlook the 
potential for friction created by private actions under RICO. 
Expanding the Scope of  the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Having identified the particular form of  international discord that private enforcement may create, the Court 
turned once again to the presumption against extraterritoriality, stating that where the risk of  friction is evident, 
the need to “enforce” the presumption is particularly strong.12 It concluded that although the presumption had 
been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive provisions, it must nevertheless be applied separately to the 
provision creating a private cause of  action. It framed the question as whether that provision creates a cause 
 
7 RJR, 136 S. Ct. 2102, slip op. at 11. 
8 Id. at 2106, slip op. at 19. 
9 Id. at 2106-2108, slip op. at 20-21. 
10 Id. at 2117, n. 9, slip op. at 20 n. 9 (quoting one of  the amicus briefs). 
11 Id. at 2108, slip op. at 22. 
12 Id. at 2107, slip op. at 21. 
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of  action for “injury suffered overseas.”13 (The harms alleged by the European Community were suffered there, 
not in the United States.) Section 1964(c) provides simply that “any person injured in his business or property” 
by a violation of  the substantive provisions of  RICO may assert a cause of  action. Although it recognized 
“any” as a term that “ordinarily connotes breadth,” the Court held that use of  that term failed to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.14 Similarly, it concluded, the unqualified reference to “business or prop-
erty” failed to communicate Congressional intent that business or property interests located outside the United 
States would be protected by the private cause of  action. Thus, although the geographic scope of  the substantive 
provisions of  RICO was held commensurate with the scope of  the predicate offenses, the scope of  the private 
cause of  action was not. Private litigants can bring claims only for injuries suffered within the territory of  the 
United States. 
This holding rests on a startling expansion of  the doctrine’s application. The presumption against extrater-
ritoriality has traditionally been understood to concern the conduct to which federal statutes apply; its own 
sphere of  application, accordingly, was limited to conduct-regulating rules. Kiobel already represented a signifi-
cant departure from this approach in that it applied the presumption to a jurisdictional statute. As 
commentators at the time pointed out, the Court’s rationale in this regard was incompatible with its own dis-
tinction in Morrison between subject-matter jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction under the securities laws.15 
RJR goes much further, stating that the presumption must be applied to any statute “regardless of  whether [it] 
regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.”16  
This is a dubious proposition. As William Dodge has pointed out, the Court can’t possibly mean what it says 
regarding jurisdictional statutes, since applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to general jurisdic-
tional statutes would deprive federal courts of  subject-matter jurisdiction Congress clearly intends them to 
enjoy.17 And to apply the presumption separately to subprovisions of  substantive statutes with extraterritorial 
effect—as in RJR itself—is likely to frustrate congressional intent. Many statutes contain sections creating pri-
vate rights of  action. Consider, for example, the laws on employment discrimination. Following the Supreme 
Court’s holding in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.18 that Title VII lacked extraterritorial effect, Congress 
amended that law to include the “clear statement” the Court sought: in the portion of  the law defining covered 
employment relationships, Congress clarified that the law protected U.S. citizens employed abroad.19 Yet the 
provisions that allow the victims of  intentional employment discrimination to sue for compensatory and puni-
tive damages (contained in other sections of  Title VII as well as in the Civil Rights Act of  1991) do not contain 
a separate statement that they apply extraterritorially. But surely Congress intended that remedy to be available 
to any covered employee harmed by intentional discrimination, not just those whose injury is suffered within 
the United States.  
The threat of  international discord created by private enforcement could have been addressed by other 
means. The presumption against extraterritoriality is just one of  many tools traditionally used to deal with 
jurisdictional conflict in cross-border regulation—others being, for example, the Charming Betsy presumption 
that ambiguous statutes should be interpreted in accordance with international law, the doctrine of  forum non 
 
13 Id. at 2109, slip op. at 24. 
14 Id. at 2108, slip op. at 22. 
15 See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65 
(2013). 
16 RJR, 136 S. Ct. 2101, slip op. at 9. 
17 William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (July 1, 2016, 
4:57 PM).  
18 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 
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conveniens, and comity. Standing alone, the presumption is not well suited to deal with all instances of  conflict. 
Indeed, in both Kiobel and RJR, some of  the Justices sketched out an alternative path. In his concurring opinion 
in Kiobel, Justice Breyer points out that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) “was enacted with ‘foreign matters’ in 
mind.”20 As a result, in his view, the presumption—which reflects the understanding that Congress ordinarily 
legislates with domestic matters in mind—“does not work well.”21 He sets out an alternative approach under 
which the jurisdictional scope of  the ATS would be determined by international jurisdictional norms (citing 
Sections 402-404 of  the Restatement (Third) of  Foreign Relations Law), and any international friction would 
be minimized by recourse to “limiting principles such as exhaustion, forum non conveniens, and comity,” as well as 
judicial deference to the views of  the executive.22 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in RJR takes a similar approach. 
She notes that “[t]o the extent extraterritorial application of  RICO [in private litigation] could give rise to comity 
concerns not present in this case, those concerns can be met through doctrines that serve to block litigation in 
U.S. courts of  cases more appropriately brought elsewhere.”23  
The New Territorialism 
Why then the majority’s exclusive reliance on the presumption, which required a significant expansion of  its 
scope? It seems to be driven by the desire to arrive at categorical rules, anchored in territorialism, to delimit the 
geographic scope of  particular laws. The ultimate effect of  this approach—and perhaps its aim—is to cut back 
on the private enforcement of  U.S. regulatory law.24 
In RJR, the Court holds that only an injury suffered within the United States can support a private cause of  
action under RICO—regardless of  whether other factors in a particular case might trigger a U.S. regulatory 
interest.25 This approach echoes that taken in several previous decisions, each of  which establishes a particular 
connecting factor to determine a statute’s legislative scope. In Morrison, after concluding that the focus of  the 
Exchange Act was not on the location of  fraudulent conduct but rather on purchases and sales of  securities in 
the United States, the Court defined the scope of  Section 10(b) by reference to the location of  the underlying 
securities transaction.26 In Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Empagran,27 the Court held that U.S. antitrust law applies to for-
eign conduct only if  that conduct causes domestic injury.28 In Kiobel, the Court did not reach the point of  
articulating a fixed rule, but indicated a similar inclination to territorialize based on the location of  the conduct 
in question, stating that it must “touch and concern” the United States.29  
 
20 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1672 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1673-74. 
23 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2115, slip op. at 8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
24 Justice Stevens makes this point in his concurrence in Morrison, characterizing the majority’s opinion as part of  “‘the Court’s 
continuing campaign to render the private cause of  action under § 10(b) toothless.’” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 286 (quoting Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
25 In RJR itself, “[a]ll defendants are U.S. corporations, headquartered in the United States, charged with a pattern of  racketeering 
activity directed and managed from the United States, involving conduct occurring in the United States. . . . In short, this case has the 
United States written all over it.” RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2115, slip op. at 7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
26 “Section 10(b) reaches the use of  a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale 
of  a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of  any other security in the United States.” Morrison, 561 
U.S. at 273. 
27 Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).  
28 Id. at 158. 
29 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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As I have argued elsewhere in the context of  securities regulation, this form of  territorialism is simply in-
compatible with the effective operation of  regulatory statutes in today’s economy, and fails to capture the ways 
in which domestic and foreign regulatory interests coincide and overlap with each other.30 More prosaically, 
such categorical rules also create difficult line-drawing problems, as the Court recognized in RJR itself: It noted 
that the application of  the “domestic injury” requirement “will not always be self-evident, as disputes may arise 
as to whether a particular alleged injury is ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic.’”31 Similar difficulties have emerged under the 
Court’s other territorial tests—in securities regulation, for instance, lower courts have struggled to identify the 
location of  non-exchange-based transactions. In Kiobel, the Court simply ducked the issue by leaving for another 
day a statement of  when activity would “touch and concern” U.S. territory sufficiently to rebut the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, also leading to uncertainty in the lower courts. 
Finally, there may be situations in which a permissible application of  U.S. law to foreign conduct might 
nevertheless create jurisdictional conflict. The Court’s recent extraterritoriality jurisprudence has not con-
fronted this question. In Kiobel, the ATS was held to lack extraterritorial reach, and no U.S.-based conduct was 
present that would have supported the law’s domestic application. In Morrison, Section 10(b) was likewise held 
to lack extraterritorial reach, and the plaintiff ’s claim was based on a foreign transaction and therefore lay 
outside the statute’s reach despite the presence of  some conduct in the United States. And in RJR itself, the 
plaintiffs had waived any claim for domestic injuries, thus removing their claim from the possible purview of  
RICO as interpreted.  
Such situations might arise, however—either because a law is found to have extraterritorial reach, or because 
a particular event is deemed to fall within the “focus” of  the statute in question, triggering a permissible do-
mestic application of  the law. In 2014, the Second Circuit addressed exactly such a situation in a securities 
lawsuit against Porsche Automobile Holdings.32 The lawsuit arose from swap agreements that had been entered 
into in the United States, and thus clearly fell within the scope of  Section 10(b) under the Morrison test. However, 
the swaps referenced securities of  a foreign issuer traded exclusively on foreign exchanges; in addition, the 
deceptive conduct alleged by the plaintiff  had occurred primarily overseas. Just as clearly, then, the application 
of  U.S. law would likely have created conflict with a foreign regulatory system. As the court recognized, “a rule 
making [Section 10(b)] applicable whenever the plaintiff ’s suit is predicated on a domestic transaction, regard-
less of  the foreignness of  the facts constituting the defendant’s alleged violation, would seriously undermine 
Morrison’s insistence that § 10(b) has no extraterritorial application.”33 It held that Morrison had established no 
such rule: “while a domestic transaction or listing is necessary to state a claim under § 10(b), a finding that these 
transactions were domestic would not suffice to compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ invocation of  § 10(b) 
was appropriately domestic.”34 Rather, it concluded, courts would need to consider the facts of  each case to 
determine whether the application of  U.S. law would be impermissibly extraterritorial. 
 
30 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Defining the Domestic Interest in International Securities Legislation, 105 ASIL 
PROCEEDINGS 402 (2011).  
31 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2111, slip op. at 27. Interestingly, though, the Court did not draw from this observation the same conclusion it 
had in the first part of its opinion. RJR had argued that even if RICO applies to foreign racketeering activity, it does not apply to the 
activity of foreign enterprises. The Court rejected this argument, and noted that  
[i]t is easy to see why Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises. A domestic enterprise requirement would lead to 
difficult line-drawing problems and counterintuitive results . . . These difficulties are largely avoided if, as we conclude today, 
RICO’s extraterritorial effect is pegged to the extraterritoriality judgments Congress has made in the predicate statutes . . .  
Id. at 2104-2105, slip op. at 15-16. 
32 Parkcentral Global Hub Limited v. Porsche Automobile Holdings S.E., 763 F.3d 198 (2d. Cir. 2014). 
33 Id. at 215. 
34 Id. at 216.  
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Conclusion: Beyond the Presumption 
The Court’s recent jurisprudence in the area of  legislative jurisdiction exhibits a clear tendency to address 
international conflict through expansive application of  the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nevertheless, 
one must ask whether RJR leaves room for lower courts to employ tools other than the presumption to limit 
the application of  U.S. law in circumstances of  jurisdictional conflict. In my view, this question must be an-
swered affirmatively. On the one hand, there are passages in the opinion suggesting that no analysis beyond the 
presumption should be undertaken. At two points, for instance, the Court quotes Morrison’s statement that “If  
§ 10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need to determine which transnational frauds it applied to; it would 
apply to all of  them (barring some other limitation).”35 Applying this to RICO, it states that “RICO . . . applies 
abroad, and so we do not need to determine which transnational (or wholly foreign) patterns of  racketeering it 
applies to; it applies to all of  them . . .”36 On the other hand, neither RJR nor the other extraterritoriality 
decisions—which, again, did not confront this particular question—expressly preclude such additional analysis. 
Moreover, the “other limitation” referred to in the passage above might include limitations imposed by doc-
trines such as comity, not merely additional limitations imposed legislatively. 
In addition, it is worth emphasizing that at the moment there are only four Justices supporting such depend-
ence on the presumption, and the concomitant move toward fixed rules defining legislative scope. Justice 
Sotomayor (along with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan) joined Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Kiobel. Had 
she not recused herself  in RJR, she would presumably have joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent there, which rests 
on similar arguments. The Court’s jurisprudence on the question of  extraterritoriality may still be a work in 
progress. 
 
35 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2101, 2103, slip op. at 10, 14. 
36 Id. at 2104, slip op. at 14.  
